Nearly every time I facilitate a leadership workshop and ask for examples of poor decision-making, George Armstrong Custer and the Battle of the Little Bighorn (or Battle of Greasy Grass) is mentioned. There’s good reason for that—but it’s also a powerful teaching moment that shows the value of using historical case studies to explore issues relevant to today’s leaders.
Almost everyone knows the disastrous outcome of the battle. Fought on June 25–26, 1876, the U.S. Army suffered a major defeat against an alliance of Lakota, Northern Cheyenne, and Arapaho warriors led by Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse. Custer divided his 7th Cavalry Regiment into three battalions—one under his own command, one under Major Marcus Reno, and one under Captain Frederick Benteen. Custer planned a coordinated attack, but Reno’s initial charge into the enemy encampment quickly faltered, forcing his men to retreat to a defensive position. Custer advanced along a separate ridge and became isolated. His battalion was soon surrounded and overwhelmed, resulting in his death along with more than 200 soldiers. Benteen, meanwhile, failed to relieve Custer’s surrounded troops on what is now known as “Last Stand Hill.”1
What most don’t consider is that Custer’s force was just one of three converging columns ordered into the region by Maj. Gen. Philip Sheridan, then Commanding General of the Military Division of the Missouri, following directives from President Ulysses Grant’s administration. The 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie had established the Great Sioux Reservation across present-day Montana, Nebraska, South Dakota, and Wyoming—including a portion of the Black Hills, which would soon be prospected for gold.
Initially, Grant seemed willing to uphold the treaty and prevent white settlers from entering tribal lands. That policy reversed after Custer’s 1874 expedition into the Black Hills discovered gold. Grant, along with Secretary of War William Belknap, Secretary of the Interior Zachariah Chandler, and Sheridan, effectively nullified treaty obligations by no longer stopping settlers or miners from entering Lakota territory. Grant offered the Lakota either an annual lease or a one-time payment for the Black Hills, but tribal leaders refused. In early 1876, the administration issued an ultimatum: Lakota bands remaining off-reservation by January 31 would be considered hostile. That decision prompted Sheridan to launch a three-pronged campaign to force them back onto the reservation.
The Dakota Column, under General Alfred Terry, marched west from Fort Abraham Lincoln and included Custer with all 12 companies of the 7th Cavalry. Colonel John Gibbon led the Montana Column from Fort Ellis, advancing eastward. A third column under General George Crook moved north from Fort Fetterman. The goal was for all three to converge simultaneously on the Lakota hunting grounds and trap the tribes between them. But harsh weather and a lack of supplies delayed the operation for months, giving the Lakota and their allies time to regroup in the spring. This was the strategic backdrop to Custer’s defeat.
In the aftermath of Little Bighorn—and to this day—blame has primarily centered on Custer for “impulsive” decision-making, particularly his choice to divide his forces into three maneuver elements while advancing on the enemy encampment. But if we trace Custer’s route throughout the campaign and break down his actions decision-by-decision—based on what he knew at each moment—a different picture emerges.
Take, for example, Custer’s visit to the Crow’s Nest with his scouts. He had originally planned to position the 7th Cavalry in the Wolf Mountains near the Crow’s Nest, keeping his troops hidden until first light on June 26, when he would launch a surprise attack. When he arrived, his Crow and Arikara scouts reported a large Lakota encampment about 14 miles away along the Little Bighorn River and said Custer’s movements had likely been observed. Despite their warnings, Custer stuck with his original plan based on his own visual reconnaissance.
However, after returning to his command, Custer learned that supplies had fallen off a pack mule during the night. A small party sent to recover them encountered hostiles looting the dropped goods. Though the troopers drove them off, Custer became convinced his position was compromised. To seize the initiative and prevent the Lakota from dispersing, he decided to attack that same afternoon.
Based on what he knew at the time, was this the right call? From the Army’s prior experiences in the northern Plains, the expectation was that Native encampments would quickly break contact and scatter under pressure. Custer even described this pattern in his 1874 memoir My Life on the Plains. Moreover, General Terry had ordered Custer on June 22—after Crook’s defeat at the Battle of the Rosebud on June 17—to proceed up the Rosebud toward the Little Bighorn and drive the Lakota toward Gibbon’s column. In that spirit, Custer’s decision aligned with those orders.
Another important question: Did Custer decisively commit his 500+ troopers? Or did he still have time to adjust? If so, when exactly did that decisive commitment occur—at the site of the Lone Tepee (less than 3 miles from the battlefield)? Or at the Flats (less than 1 mile away)?
The counterpoint, of course, is that Custer should have realized this wasn’t a “typical” Plains Indian force. Crook’s defeat and withdrawal from the Rosebud eight days earlier had already removed one of the three converging columns from the operation. It also demonstrated that the Lakota were massed in significant numbers and were prepared to fight a prolonged battle. Both facts should have been clear to Terry and Custer. Perhaps they discounted Crook’s experience—after all, his post–Civil War career had been spent mostly in the Southwest, and the Rosebud was his first major fight against Plains nations.
These all have tie-ins to today’s leadership development. When is it too late to change course? How much information is enough for us to make critical decisions? How much do we let past success guide our future decision making? While the legacy of the Battle of Little Bighorn remains controversial—symbolizing both American Indian resistance and U.S. military misjudgment. Whether or not this brief post changes your view of Custer’s actions on the day of the battle, I hope it shows the value of using historical case studies—and at the very least, encourages us to question conventional wisdom.
- All maps are from the fantastic Atlas of the Sioux Wars: Second Edition, available here: https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/educational-services/staff-rides/atlas-of-the-sioux-wars-second-edition.pdf ↩︎
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